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CASES NOTED
NEGLIGENCE PER SE DEFINED IN FLORIDA
Petitioner, Pedro Nieves dejesus, and his wife were driving down
a road on a dark night when the car he was operating struck an unlit
tankcar belonging to respondent railway company. The black tankcar
was blocking the road while the train's engine was several hundred feet
down the track. Dejesus and his wife brought this negligence action
against the railroad. The railroad based its defense on contributory
negligence. The jury found for the plaintiff upon the charge that if the
statute in question had been violated, negligence would result as a direct
consequence of the violation. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held that the charge was erroneous and consequently
reversed and remanded.' The court certified a question to the Supreme
Court of Florida requesting a ruling to determine which type of statute,
when violated, would result in negligence per se.2
The Supreme Court of Florida, on conflict certorari review held,
reversed: violation of a statute imposing upon a railroad a duty to pro-
tect occupants of automobiles from colliding with unlighted trains block-
ing highways at night at unlighted crossings was negligence per se.
deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
The three basic elements of negligence per se are (1) violation of a
statute creating a duty to protect a certain class of people; (2) damage
caused by said violation; and (3) the damage so caused must be to a
member of the protected class. Once there is a violation meeting these
criteria the great majority of the courts hold that an unexcused violation
is conclusive on the issue of negligence and the jury must be so directed.'
Florida decisions concerning negligence per se have in the past
followed three distinct lines of reasoning. Each decision is based on the
particular type of statute violated. Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein4 con-
cerned a violation of a strict liability statute;' Hoskins v. Jackson Grain
Co.' concerned violation of a statute which did not provide for strict
liability, but which nevertheless set standards of care to protect a certain
1. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. dejesus, 266 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
2. The district court presented the question in this manner: "Is the violation of a
statute or ordinance, other than those specifically adopted for the purpose of establishing
a stricter duty of care, negligence per se or evidence of negligence in a civil action?" The
supreme court, after noting that the question could not be answered in the manner asked,
replied that, "[v]iolations of statutes, other than those imposing a form of strict liability,
may be either negligence per se or evidence of negligence." dejesus v. Seaboard Coast Line
R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (1973). The supreme court also granted certiorari in view of the
conflict between the district court and its decision in Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.
2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
3. W. PROSSER, HANBOOK o rE LAW OF TORTS 200 (4th ed. 1971). For a good over-
view of negligence per se, see Note, Ferrell v. Baxter: Negligence Per Se in Alaska, 2 U.C.L.A.-
ALASKA L. Rxv. 54 (1972).
4. 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959) [hereinafter referred to as Tamiami].
S. See note 12 inIra and accompanying text.
6. 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953) [hereinafter referred to as Hoskins].
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class of people; Richardson v. Fountain7 and Allen v. Hooper8 concerned
violations of statutes protecting the public as a whole.
The defendant gun dealer in Tamiami violated a Florida state
statute and a Miami city ordinance prohibiting sales of firearms to
minors.' The plaintiff, father of the boy who bought the weapon, sued
as a result of an accident which occurred when the gun accidentally
discharged blowing off his son's thumb. The boy was clearly contributorily
negligent and the defendant offered that defense. The Supreme Court
of Florida upheld the district court's decision that violation of this par-
ticular type of statute constituted negligence per se and contributory
negligence was no defense."° Addressing itself to the matter of violation
of strict liability statutes, the court said:
In considering this group of unusual and exceptional statutes,
the courts usually find a legislative intent to remove the defense
of contributory negligence. Such statutes have been construed
to place the entire responsibility upon the defendant, and to re-
quire him to protect not only plaintiffs who are exercising rea-
sonable care but those who are contributorily negligent as well. 1
The decision relied upon the Restatement of Torts definition of a strict
liability statute, that is, one which is to protect a certain class of persons
from their inability to protect themselves. 2 It was noted that this class
was also protected by child labor acts.'"
Violation of a penal statute that did not set strict liability but
which was intended to protect a certain class of people was the subject
of Hoskins. 4 There, a seed dealer sold plaintiff a mismarked batch of
seeds, resulting in the loss of his crop because the type of seed received
did not grow well in the type of soil on plaintiff's farm. He sued the
wholesaler on the theory of breach of an implied warranty. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Florida decided the case on the theory of negli-
gence per se, finding the wholesaler guilty of violating a penal statute
7. 154 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963) [hereinafter referred as Richardson].
8. 126 Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1937) [hereinafter referred to as Allen].
9. FLA. STAT. § 790.18 (1971) ; MIAmi, FLA., CODE OF LAWS § 61-1(d) (1967).
10. For a case in which the District Court of Appeal, First District, found no negligence
per se on similar facts, see Williams v. Youngblood, 132 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963),
in which a child sued the father of a playmate who shot him with a B.B. gun. The child
was held not to be a member of the class protected by a statute prohibiting the use of B.B.
guns by children without proper supervision.
11. Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1959).
12. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 (1965).
13. See Tampa Shipbuilding and Eng'r. Corp. v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419, 181 So. 403 (1938);
Baldridge v. Hatcher, 266 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), wherein the size of the plaintiff's
son was offered as a defense to a violation of a child labor statute. The court said, "[tibis
must raise precisely the point the legislature had in mind in protecting minors from certain
inherently dangerous conduct. If size were the measure of maturity of judgment, King Kong
could be President." Id. at 113.
14. 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
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which regulated the marking of seed. The court set out the general
negligence per se rule for Florida:
Where one violates a penal statute imposing upon him a duty
designed to protect another he is negligent as a matter of law,
therefore responsible for such damage as is proximately caused
by his negligence."
This rule was applied to the facts in deJesus and determined the outcome.
The third type of statute protects the public as a whole. This cate-
gory includes traffic laws, municipal ordinances, and regulations of admin-
istrative bodies. Florida, as well as many other states, does not apply
the negligence per se rule to these laws."6 Violations of these laws are
either considered to be prima facie evidence of negligence, which may be
overcome, or the law may be read in a manner such that it does not pro-
vide protection to a certain class of people. Allen" dealt with the traffic
law aspects of this problem. The Supreme Court of Florida stated that
the Florida view concerning traffic violations is that these violations are
prima facie evidence of negligence. This prima facie evidence can be
overcome by proof of surrounding circumstances and conditions which
will eliminate the claim of negligence. The final determination of negli-
gence is to be made by the jury.' In Richardson,"9 the law violated was
a city penal ordinance which provided for the height of awnings. The
plaintiff struck his head on a low awning which violated this ordinance
and sued on the basis of negligence per se. The defendant store offered
the defense of contributory negligence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
Second District, held that negligence per se did not apply since "the
ordinance in question is not designed to protect a particular class of
persons within the meaning of the case law .. ."0 In the course of its
decision the court made the statement that "this jurisdiction follows the
weight of authority in holding that except as to penal ordinances and
statutes other than those involving traffic, such is negligence per se.""
This confusing statement was part of the reason that the Supreme Court
of Florida outlined the rules for negligence per se in delesus.
The following rules laid out in deJesus are clear cut. If a statute
providing for strict liability is violated, then there is negligence per se
and contributory negligence is no defense.2 If a statute establishes a
duty to take precautions to protect a particular class of persons from
a particular injury or type of injury, a violation is negligence per se. How-
15. Id. at 515.
16. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 201 (4th ed. 1971).
17. 126 Fla. 458, 171 So. 513 (1937).
18. Id. at 463, 171 So. at 516.
19. 154 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
20. Id. at 712.
21. Id. at 711.
22. See Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959).
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ever, contributory negligence can be a defense to the liability imposed. 3
Violation of any other type of statute is prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. These statutes include traffic law statutes. 4
Violations of any type of statute which would be considered negli-
gence per se by the above rules must be proven to meet all the elements
of negligence. The plaintiff must show that he is a member of the pro-
tected class, that he suffered injury of the type the statute was designed
to prevent and that the violation was the proximate cause of his injury.
The court, applying the above rules to the instant case, held that
the statute imposed a duty to protect automobile drivers and their pas-
sengers from running into unlit railroad trains, and that the defendant's
violation constituted negligence per se.
The rules laid down in delesus should help the lower courts interpret
statutes to determine whether violations constitute negligence per se. The
rules are clear cut and easy to apply. The first and third rules adopt the
prior case law directly. The second rule, however, does not follow pre-
existing case law as closely. As noted in Hoskins, the violation of a
statute setting standards of care to protect a class is negligence per se if
all conditions are met. There is no mention of any viable defense. In the
delesus rule, contributory negligence becomes an allowable defense.2
This is a more realistic, less mechanical view of the law which should
lead to a realization that other defenses are appropriate. Other jurisdic-
tions such as Oregon, have shown a willingness to modify and enlarge
the defenses to negligence per se, although in a limited manner.2 6 Per-
haps Florida will follow these leaders and continue to liberalize these
rules. Such a liberalization would give juries a greater latitude in deter-
mining negligence and the resulting liability.
HOWARD J. MARX
23. See Note 24 infra.
24. Negligence per se with the possibility of excuse provides a means of circum-
venting the legislatively predefined standard of conduct. A prima facie case for
negligence adopts the legislative standard long enough to put the question before
the jury, but then allows a rebuttal of both liability and the appropriateness of the
standard itself-as a test of civil liability.
Note, Statutory Negligence in Oregon, 7 WnxAwzir L.J. 469, 477 (1971).
25. In Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959), the court implied that
contributory negligence may be a defense to negligence per se when strict liability was not
the standard, but made no ruling on this point. With the adoption of comparative negli-
gence, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, (Fla. 1973), not mentioned in the noted case, this
is no longer an absolute defense. Courts will probably apportion damages as if the case were
an ordinary negligence case. The same result would apply with a violation of a traffic type
statute. Comparative negligence would have no effect concerning violations of strict liability
statutes since contributory negligence was never a defense in such cases.
26. See Note, Statutory Negligence in Oregon, 7 WML.AMETTE L.J. 469 (1971).
